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RECENT DECISIONS

raised whether the court should classify gift cases under the Fraudulent Conveyancing Act or under the Bulk Sales Act. Clearly, a Plaintiff
would use the latter where possible.
As a matter of policy, it is the writer's opinion the court has arrived at a sound conclusion, and in as much as the Wisconsin Bulk
Sale Statute s contains the word "transfer", the Wisconsin Court
should follow the principal case and include gratuitous transfers in its
statutory construction.
DOROTHY PROPSO1x

Federal Income Taxation-Nonrecognition of Gain on Sale of
Residence-Petitioner, a specialist in foreign economics, was sent
to Europe by the U.S. State Department. While there he rented his
house in Maryland. He returned to this country and took a job in
Washington. He tried to evict the tenant but was forestalled by
Federal rent regulations. Being in need of housing, he sold the house,
subject to the lease, and bought another house, which cost more than
the proceeds from the sale of the old one. The purchaser of the old
house was not able to obtain possession for six months. Petitioner did
not declare the gain on the sale as income, believing this sale fell under
Section 112(n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency on the ground that the old house was not
petitioner's residence, since it was rented out at the time of the sale.
Held: Judgment for petitioner; the statute was designed to aid cases
such as this and does not require actual occupation of the house at
the time of the sale. The decision is limited strictly to the facts of the
case. Ralph L. Trisko, 29 T.C. No. 59 (1957).
Pervading many of the nonrecognition sections of the Code is the
idea that where there is an exchange of property of a like kind, the
taxpayer's holdings have not substantially changed and he should not
be taxed on any gain from the exchange because his economic situation has not been changed.' While most of the nonrecognition sections
apply to exchanges only, Section 112(n) of the 1939 Code (renum28

riS. STAT. §241.18 (1955). "The sale, transfer, or assignment, in bulk, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade, and in the regular prosecution of
the business of the seller, transferor or assignor, of any part, or the whole, of
any stock of goods, wares and merchandise, or of the fixtures pertaining to
the same, or of such goods, wares and merchandise and fixtures, including
such sales, transfers and assignments made in consideration of an existing
indebtedness, shall be conclusively presumed to be fraudulent and void. ."
Thus in Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir.
1951), in discussing section 112, the general nonrecognition section in the
1939 Code, the Court stated:
"Subsection 112(b)(1) and 112(e) indicate the controlling policy
and purpose of the section, that is, the nonrecognition of gain or loss
in transactions where neither is readily measured in terms of money,
where in theory the taxpayer may have realized gain or loss but where
in fact his economic situation is the same after as it was before the
transaction."
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bered Section 1034 in the 1954 Code) applies to sales as well as exchanges. However, basically, the transaction involved under Section
112(n) is an exchange, since the taxpayer, at the close of the entire
transaction, still is in possession of a residence, just as he was before
the transaction. Thus the result accomplished is comparable to the
exchange of investment property for other investment property 2 or
common stock for common stock. 3 Before 1951 this result in the
change of residences was ignored and a taxpayer in such a situation
was taxed at capital gains rates on any gain from the sale of the old
residence. This obviously could work a hardship on a taxpayer who
was forced to move because of a change of employment or for other
reasons. Congress, recognizing this hardship,4 amended the Code in
1951 so as to postpone recognition of gain from the sale of a taxpayer's
principal residence when the proceeds are reinvested in another residence within a limited time period.5 This brings this area in line with
the other nonrecognition sections. The subsection itself indicates that
the exchange must be a sale of property used as a principal residence
and a purchase of property to be so used. In other words, there must
be an "exchange" of property of a like kind.
In the Trisko case the important question is whether or not there
was a substantial change in the nature of the asset held before and
after the transaction. If there was not, then the case definitely falls
under the basic theory of all the nonrecognition sections and there
can be no quarrel with the Tax Court decision. The Tax Court recognizes this basic theory, when, in discussing the purpose of Section
112(n), it states:
"If all the proceeds of such a sale (of the old residence)
were used in the purchase of the new home, the transaction was
to be considered in effect as a nontaxable exchange of the old
home for the new." 6
1954, §1031.
1954, §1036.
4H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Congress, 1st Sess. (1951), 1951-2 Cu.m. BULL. 357,
at p. 377.
SInt. Rev. Code of 1939.
Sec. 112. RECOGNITION OF GAIN OR LOSS.
(n) Gain From Sale or Exchange of Residence. (1) Nonrecognition of Gain.-If property (hereinafter in this subsection called "old residence") used by the taxpayer as his principal
residence is sold by him and within a period beginning one year prior
to the date of such sale and ending one year after such date, property
(hereinafter in this subsection called "new residence") is purchased
and used by the taxpayer as his principal residence, gain (if any)
from such sale shall be recognized only to the extent that the taxpayer's selling price of the old residence exceeds the taxpayer's cost
of purchasing the new residence.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Sec. 112(n), added by Sec. 318 (a), Revenue Act
of 1951, as amended, Public Law 567, Sec. 1, (1952). The Int. Rev. Code of
1954 changed the number of this subsection to Section 1034 as well as making
other changes not material to this discussion.
6 Ralph L. Trisko, 29 T.C. No. 59 (1957).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF

3 INT. REV. CODE OF
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The Court readily concedes that this is a "hardship" case of the type
to which Congress" intended to afford relief. However, to come under
this subsection, the exchange must be of residences and conceding the
hardship does not necessarily mean that the transaction falls under the
subsection. To be non-taxable the exchange must be of property of a
like kind.
The obvious question must be whether the renting of the house so
changed the character of the asset as to take it out of the residence
category which the section in question covers. If the house was removed from this category, there was not an "exchange" of assets of
a like kind and the transaction was not within either the letter or the
spirit of the nonrecognition sections. The Tax Court found that the
mere renting out of the house while the petitioner was overseas did
not change the residential character of the asset. To support this the
Court cites the House s and Senate9 Committee Reports as well as the
Treasury Regulations 0 on the section. The latter provides the following test to determine if the asset has changed character:
"Whether or not property is used by the taxpayer as his
residence . . . depends upon all the facts and circumstances in

each individual case, including the bona fides of the taxpayer."
The Tax Court was satisfied that all the facts and circumstances of
the case, including the bona fides of the taxpayer, justified a finding
that the taxpayer used the property as a residence; that this was not
changed by renting the house; and, that the residence retained the
character needed to fit under the subsection.
The question of renting as changing the character of the asset was
referred to in the reports of both the Senate1' and House 12 Committees
and in the Regulations. The example used to illustrate the point that
the taxpayer does not have to be actually occupying the old residence
at the time of sale is that the taxpayer may rent the old residence
after purchasing the new while he tries to sell the old. 3 While this
example is not on all fours with the Trisko fact situation, the rule
which is illustrated does lend support to the petitioner's contention.
Upon the above authority the Tax Court determined that the
REP. No. 586, 82nd Congress, 1st Sess. (1951), 1951-2 Cufm. BULL. 357,
at p. 377.
s Ibid.
9 S. REP. No. 781 (Supp.), 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1951), 1951-2 Cums. BULL.
458, at p. 566.RFG. 111, Sec. 29.112(n)-1(b) (1953).
7 H.R.

-10U.S.

TREAS.

The present regulation on this subject, Reg. 1.1034, is only slightly changed
from 29.112(n).
11 S. REP. No. 781 (Supp.), 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 318 (1951), 1951-2 Cum. BuLL.
458, at p. 566.
12 H. REP. No. 586, 82nd Congress, 1st Sess. (1951), 1951-2 Cum. BuLL. 357, at
p. 377.
13 Joint Committee Staff Summary of Provisions of Revenue Act of 1951, 1951-2
Cum. BULL. 287, at p. 309.
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house had not lost its character as petitioner's principal residence and,
therefore, there was no substantial change in the assets involved in
the transaction. Applying the aforesaid basic theory of nonrecognition,
this case was definitely one for application of Section 112(n).
The Service achieved the opposite result in a similar situation in
1955. An Air Force officer rented his house when his post was
changed. Upon retirement from the Air Force, having decided to live
in another city, he sold the old residence, obtaining a gain thereon,
and invested the proceeds in a new house in the other city. The Commissioner, in ruling that this case was not entitled to the benefit of
Section 112(n) relief, held:
"
the facts and circumstances in the case do not indicate
t..
the renting of the residence was a temporary arrangement entered into during a period made necessary by the purchase of a
new residence. Accordingly, it is held that the provisions of
section 112(n) of the Code are not applicable under the facts
and circumstances herein present."' 4
The Commissioner's position in the Trisko case was consistent with
this ruling. However, the facts of the present case may be distinguished from the Ruling on the question of the bona fides of the
taxpayer.
As we have seen, a part of the test used to determine if the
property has changed its character is the bona fides of the taxpayer.
The Air Force officer voluntarily sold his old home and made no
effort to return to it. Apparently the Commissioner took this as an
indication of an intention to change the old home into investment
property and as showing that the taxpayer was not seeking relief
under Section 112(n) in good faith. On the other hand, Trisko made
every effort to get the house back but was precluded by Federal rent
regulations and had to buy a new house to have a place to live. Certainly he had no intention of changing the character of the old residence and his acts were consistent with such lack of intention.
Attacking the problem with the basic approach of all nonrecognition
sections in mind, i.e., that the taxpayer has simply exchanged property
and has not changed his economic situation, 15 leads to a consideration
of the effect of construing the rented residence as property held for
investment purposes. If the renting is given the effect of changing
the character of the property, as the Commissioner contended in the
Trisko case, the property becomes eligible for nonrecognition treatment under Section 1031 (a). 6 If the taxpayer is able to trade the
14 REv. RUL. 55-222, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 349.
15 See Note 1, supra.
16

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1031.

Exchange of Property Held for Productive Use or Investment.
(a) Nonrecognition of gain or loss from exchange solely in kind.
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house for another house of like kind, i.e., held for investment purposes, no gain will be recognized from such transaction. While the
property received in the exchange must be held "either for productive
use in trade or business or for investment",' 7 no authority has been
found to indicate that such use must be of any definite duration. Conceivably the length of time needed to evict a tenant may be a sufficient
holding period and then the taxpayer would have the new residence
and also have avoided recognition of gain on the transaction.
The reader is cautioned to bear in mind the doctrine of Gregory
v. Helvering," where the Supreme Court stated:
"... the question for determination is whether what was
done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the
statute intended."
As Judge Learned Hand pointed out in the Circuit Court decision in
the same case:
"....

it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a

transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition."' 9
The Commissioner, if he attempted to overthrow such a scheme, could
also rely on the Century Electric Co. case where the Court said:
"The transaction here involved may not be separated into its
component parts for tax purposes. Tax consequences must depend on what actually was intended and accomplished rather
than on the separate steps taken to reach the desired ends."'0
The Commissioner and the courts might well find that this scheme
accomplished an end not intended by the section in question.
RICHARD T. BECKER

Labor Law-Enforceability of Hot Cargo Clause-A shipment
of doors, manufactured by the Paine Lumber Company of Oshkosh,
Wisconsin and purchased from the Sand Door and Plywood Company,
were delivered to a hospital construction site on which Harvsted and
Jensen were general contractors. A few days later, on August 17,
1954, Fliesher, a business agent of petitioner, Local 1976, visited the
site and informed Harvsted and Jensen's foreman, a member of the
local, that the doors were non-union and could not be hung. The foreman then ordered the employees to stop handling the objectionable
doors and work on them ceased. The general contractors were then
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive use
in trade or business or for investment . . . is exchanged solely for
property of a like kind to be held either for productive use in trade or
business or for investment.
1 Ibid.
18 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), at p. 469.
19 Ielvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2nd Cir. 1934) at p. 819.
20 Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir. 1951).

